

An Unassailable Advantage: The British Use of Principles of Joint Operations from 1758-1762

A Monograph

by

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2017

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 04-01-2017		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) JUN 2016-MAY 2017	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE An Unassailable Advantage: The British Use of Principles of Joint Operations from 1758-1762.				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Matthew Cahill				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship, Advanced Military Studies Program				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <p>In the Seven Years War the British defeated the French and created the most powerful Empire on earth. However, from 1755-1757 British joint operations were marred by defeats to outright disasters. This monograph investigates the British ability as a learning organization to reformulate doctrine, improve their unity of effort, mass and understanding of objective. The British formulated specific command and control over amphibious operations to ensure both the British Army and Royal Navy understood its role and responsibility in getting land forces to the shore and sustaining them there. This monograph investigates what US military planners can learn from the study of historical joint operations.</p> <p>This monograph focuses on four specific joint operations during the Seven Years War: Rochefort, Louisbourg, Guadeloupe, and Havana. Rochefort, a failed operation, highlights the importance lessons learned by Britain to apply later in the war. Each one of these operations highlights the ability of the British to continually improve their joint operations in the Seven Years War. The ability of the British to conduct joint operations gave them an unassailable advantage over the French.</p>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Joint Operations, Unity of Effort, Mass, Objective, Amphibious Operations, British Military; Seven Years War.					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)

Monograph Approval Page

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Abstract

An Unassailable Advantage: The British Use of Principles of Joint Operations from 1758-1762, by Major Matthew J. Cahill, US Army 39 Pages.

In the Seven Years War the British defeated the French and created the most powerful empire on earth. However, from 1755-1757 British joint operations were marred by defeats to outright disasters. This monograph investigates the British ability as a learning organization to reformulate doctrine, improve their unity of effort, mass, and understanding of objective. The British formulated specific command and control over amphibious operations to ensure both the British Army and Royal Navy understood their roles and responsibilities in getting land forces to the shore and sustaining them there. This monograph investigates what US military planners can learn from the study of historical joint operations. This monograph focuses on four joint operations during the Seven Years War: Rochefort, Louisbourg, Guadeloupe, and Havana. Rochefort, a failed operation, highlights the importance lessons learned by Britain to apply later in the war. Each one of these operations highlights the ability of the British to continually improve their joint operations. The ability of the British to conduct joint operations gave them an unassailable advantage over the French.

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Acknowledgement

I want to acknowledge the love and support of my wife Nicole H. Cahill and my children Beckett and Parker who supported me throughout and allowed me the time to research and write this monograph. I also want to acknowledge my monograph director Ricardo Herrera, who spent time teaching, coaching, and mentoring me through this process. Dr. Herrera's insight and advice were invaluable in completing this monograph. Finally, I would like to acknowledge Colonel Eric Laforest, my seminar leader, whose critical eye and advice helped me refine the monograph.

Acronyms

JP Joint Publication

Illustrations

1	Rochefort, 1757	12
2	Siege of Louisbourg, 1758.....	14
3	Guadeloupe Operation, 1759	23
4	Siege of Havana, 1762.....	26

Introduction

The British army should be a projectile to be fired by the British navy.

— Sir Edward Grey

On 10 February 1763, the British signed the Treaty of Paris and ended of the Seven Years War. British victories during the war created an empire, which, a decade later, Sir George Macartney famously described as, “a vast empire, on which the sun never sets, and whose bounds nature has not yet ascertained.”¹ Britain achieved its political objectives of conquering Canada, retaining security for the British Isles, and blocking French armies in Europe and India. No military power in the world could challenge Britain on the Atlantic, in America, or in India. Britain’s successes in the war gave it the ability to control overseas trade and made it the most powerful country in Europe. However, in 1756 after the disasters of Monongahela and Minorca few in Britain would have imagined the ascent of their nation to the top of Europe.² In 1756, France was the dominant power in Europe and its armies and powerful fleets gave the impression it would emerge victorious. British failures in 1757 confirmed to many people France’s inevitable victory. The ability of the British to go from failure to unparalleled joint operational ability shows the hallmarks of a learning organization.

¹ Brendan Simms *Three Victories and A Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 502.

² The Battle of Monongahela was fought in 1755 between British and French forces in western Pennsylvania. A combined force of 800 Canadian militia and Native American allies routed 1,300 British regulars and militia with over 450 British killed including their commander General Edward Braddock. The defeat was shocking to the British public and government. The siege of Minorca saw a British fleet under Admiral John Byng defeated and failing to support an Army force besieged at Port Mahon. The British government and public were so outraged they demanded the court-martial of Admiral Byng. He was convicted of cowardice and executed on the deck of HMS *Monarch* on March 14, 1757. For more on these events see Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America 1754-1766* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000) for more on the Battle of Monongahela and Martin Robson, *A History of the Royal Navy: The Seven Years War* (London: I.B. Taurus, 2016) for more on Admiral John Byng.

Studying British expeditionary operations in the Seven Years War gives military planners an opportunity to understand the complexity of joint warfare and the development of joint doctrine. Joint warfare is imperative to the security of the United States. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen says, “US military power today is unsurpassed on the land and sea and in the air....Even more important, the ability to integrate these diverse capabilities into a joint whole that is greater than the sum of the Service parts is an unassailable American strategic advantage.”³ This means a study of successful joint operations is important for United States military professionals’ because the United States will continue to utilize its air, naval, and land forces abroad in a joint force capacity. US Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, states, “Joint operations are conducted routinely and efficiently in the current operational environment. To maintain and enhance this efficiency, joint leaders must diligently study, apply, teach, and ultimately provide insights to improve joint doctrine.”⁴ Joint doctrine brings clarity to the roles and responsibilities of services as part of a joint force. The value in studying British joint operations in the Seven Years War enables military planners to learn from the challenges they faced and helps the United States improve its doctrine. Military planners can appreciate that British failures between 1755-1757 facilitated the learning and growth that enabled their success from 1758-1763. Therefore, it is worth asking what did the British learn and how did they improve their conduct of joint operations after defeats in 1755-1757 during the Seven Years War?

³ Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), IV-1.

⁴ JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), ii.

The British improved their conduct of joint operations by utilizing what are today known as the principles of unity of command and effort, mass, and objective. While these principles, as we define them in joint doctrine, were not articulated until the 1800s there are clear examples of their application at Louisbourg, Guadeloupe, and Havana.⁵ JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, defines unity of command, mass and objective, which is important for clarity. The JP 3-0, defines unity of command as:

Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. During multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort—the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—is the product of successful unified action.⁶

While the British did not achieve unity of command under a single commander, they did achieve unity of effort. JP 3-0 highlights that if unity of command is not possible, which it was not in the eighteenth century British military, unity of effort is paramount for decisive results. This was decisive for Britain. The unity of effort between its small army and powerful navy formations continually triumphed over challenging situations. Once the British established unity of effort they used their superior strategic mobility to mass at objectives. JP 3-0 defines mass as:

The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results. In order to achieve mass, appropriate joint force capabilities are integrated and synchronized where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects of combat power, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to produce decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.⁷

⁵ JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, A-1. US Principles of joint operations are based on the Principles of War developed by Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini. *The Art of War* (London: Greenhill Books), 1992.

⁶ JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, A-2.

⁷ Ibid., A-2.

British forces from 1758-1762 continually displayed the ability to mass in short periods of time and properly sustain themselves until the objective was seized. Finally, clearly defined objectives are key in any military operation. Clearly defined objectives give purpose to military operations, allow commanders to visualize a military endstate, and ensure resources are properly applied to achieve strategic objectives. JP 3-0 defines objective as:

The purpose of specifying the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal...Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives.... Additionally, changes to the military objectives may occur because political and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or they may occur because the situation itself changes. **The JFC should anticipate these shifts in political goals necessitating changes in the military objectives.** The changes may be very subtle, but if not made, achievement of the military objectives may no longer support the political goals, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised.⁸

One of the keys to objective is the ability to anticipate the shift in political and strategic objectives to properly assess new military objectives. The British successfully shifted their military objectives in later operations against Guadeloupe and Havana to meet new political objectives. While these principles are only three of the twelve Principles of Joint Operations, they highlight key improvements in the British ability to conduct joint operations from 1758-1762.⁹

Literature Review

There are several themes, some contrasting and contradicting each other, which run through the current literature on the Seven Years War. The first themes are that William Pitt's influence, as Southern Secretary, was decisive and unparalleled. Brian Tunstall, an early biographer, touts, "As Secretary of State he had combined both theories of strategy with unequalled vigor and success."¹⁰ According to Tunstall, William Pitt had combined the operations on the continent with naval and

⁸ JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, A-1.

⁹ Ibid., A1-A5.

¹⁰ Brian Tunstall, *William Pitt: Earl of Chatham* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938), 330.

American operations to create a cohesive British strategy. The second themes are that Pitt's efforts were not decisive and he simply guided Britain's war effort. Jeremy Black finds Pitt's efforts cannot be detached from later disasters, asking the question, "British success in the Seven Years War can be attributed in part to his actions, political as much as strategic, but the beneficial consequences of the conflict can be queried. Did it make the American Revolution inevitable by removing the threat to America from French proximity in Canada and was 1776 therefore ultimately Chatham's responsibility?"¹¹ Karl W. Schweizer in *Frederick the Great, William Pitt, and Lord Bute: The Anglo-Prussian Alliance, 1756-1763*, is also tempered in his acknowledgement of Pitt's actions. He attributes the success to clarifying the objectives of the war and devising a strategy to properly coordinate to achieve with the proper means.¹² However, he claims it was more improvising than a set theory or doctrine.¹³ Hugh Boscawen in *The Capture of Louisbourg, 1758* takes a view like Schweizer, "In 1757 Pitt had clear objectives for the following year. Although lack of evidence makes it hard to be definitive about how systematically policy was developed, his motives included personal political survival."¹⁴ Boscawen cites the failures of previous ministries to bring victories as key to their downfall. Pitt, argues Boscawen, needed military victories to ensure his alliance with the Duke of Newcastle and the support of the king. The final theme is that Pitt did a great deal to set strategy, but he needed assistance in its execution. Fred Anderson in, *The Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of the British Empire in North America, 1754-1766* highlights this cooperative effort: "The absence of bureaucratic machinery gave Pitt the ability

¹¹ Jeremy Black, *Pitt the Elder* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 303.

¹² Karl Schweizer, *Frederick the Great, William Pitt, and Lord Bute: The Anglo-Prussian Alliance, 1756-1763* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1991), 96.

¹³ Schweizer, *Frederick the Great*, 96.

¹⁴ Hugh Boscawen, *The Capture of Louisbourg, 1758* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 316.

to control strategy and policy personally, but it also imposed upon him a workload that not even he, at his most manic, could sustain. He had turned for help...to the first lord of the Admiralty, Lord Anson, and to the commander in chief of the army, Lord Ligonier.”¹⁵ Anderson contends Pitt used the talent around him to formulate and execute his strategy. Field Marshal John Ligonier provided forces for Pitt’s operations, while Lord George Anson provided sea transport and covering forces for landings. The British war effort defined itself through a unity of effort, the ability to properly shift strategic and operational objectives to meet new political objectives, and the use of strategic mobility to create mass.

While Pitt may have selected the strategy, the planning and execution fell on the shoulders of the top military leaders, Admiral Anson and Field Marshal Ligonier. The literature on Anson provides the picture of a good sailor, excellent administrator, and superb judge of talent. Anson proved his seamanship and fighting qualities during his circumnavigation of the globe and later major victory at First Battle of Cape Finisterre in 1747. Nicholas A.M. Rodger highlights Anson’s circumvention of standing policy during the Seven Years War to promote younger captains to important commands over older admirals.¹⁶ He did this to ensure Britain had the most capable officers in command, rather than the man with the most seniority or political connections. Field Marshal John Ligonier’s biography, by Rex Whitworth, *Field Marshal Lord Ligonier: A Story of the British Army, 1702-1770*, gives great insight into the interaction between himself and the various levels of government. He, like Anson, appointed junior officers to high positions to ensure the British Army had capable officers in command as well. This biography also gives an

¹⁵ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America 1754-1766* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 305. Anderson highlights that they cooperated better than any two service chiefs in British history. An important point because at the time there was no doctrine on joint service planning.

¹⁶ Nicholas A.M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 325-326.

understanding on his role as a military planner. A somewhat more obscure figure in British military history, Ligonier helped plan and resource all British operations after 1758. Some have called Ligonier the greatest British soldier between Marlborough and Wellington.¹⁷ Julian Corbett gives him the highest praise, “By universal consent he was regarded, whether in the field or in council, as one of the most brilliant and accomplished soldiers that ever served the British Crown.”¹⁸ Anson’s and Ligonier’s qualifications clearly elucidate their selections to the head of the navy and army.

However, it was not guaranteed Anson and Ligonier would work well together. Anderson claims, “Together Anson and Ligonier would serve as chiefs of staff to Pitt and, in an unprecedented example of cooperation between the army and navy, implement the strategic system by which Pitt proposed to win the greatest victory in English history.”¹⁹ Clearly, after 1757, the problem of unity of effort was solved at the strategic level, with Pitt guiding and his chiefs enacting the desired strategy. The question, however, remains unanswered at the operational and tactical level: What did the British learn and how did the British successfully implement unity of effort, mass, and objective in joint operations during the Seven Years War after disasters from 1755-1757?

British Problems in the Seven Years War

The British were ill prepared militarily for the Seven Years War. The British initially defined their problems in protecting Britain, Hannover, and defeating France with their limited army forces available for operations on the continent. The main concern was protecting the British Isles.²⁰ Charles Stuart, the grandson of James II, seeking to recover the British crown, had launched

¹⁷ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 215.

¹⁸ Julian Corbett, *England in the Seven Years’ War; A Study in Combined Strategy*, London: Longmans, Green, 1907), 1:34.

¹⁹ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 215.

²⁰ David French, *The British Way of Warfare 1688-2000* (New York: Routledge Press, 2015), 51.

a French-supported invasion in 1745 and exposed the dangers of leaving Britain vulnerable.²¹ British leaders were certain the French would attempt another invasion during the Seven Years War. David French points out that fully one-third of the British Army remained in Britain from 1756-1763.²² French further expounds, “The troops kept at home during the War of Jenkin’s Ear, the War of Austrian Succession, and the Seven Year’s War reveal their [the British Government’s] doubts about the ability of the navy to safeguard Britain against invasion.”²³ The Royal Navy would consistently retain powerful formations in defense of Britain throughout the war.²⁴ In terms of protecting Hannover, the British would be unable to send large troop formations to Hannover until 1758. The British government did not establish a stronger militia system until 1757 and the law would raise 37,000 militiamen to free regulars for operations.²⁵ The British Army took part in the Battle of Minden in 1759, but only after sufficient militia was raised at home for protection. Due to the shortage of British troops, George II insisted on using German troops to protect Hannover.²⁶ Hanoverian, Brunswick, and Hessian troops comprised the entire The Army of Observation in 1757. In 1758, the British government took the entire Hanoverian Army into its pay as proxies for British troops and trusted Prussia’s Frederick II’s protégé, Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, to command the army.²⁷ The primary way the British would secure Hannover and defeat France in Europe was through financial subsidies to Prussia and other German kingdoms; not

²¹ Reed Browning, *The War of the Austrian Succession* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 240-244. Browning highlights at the end of October 1745 Charles Stuart was moving on London and a French army was getting ready to ship to Britain in support.

²² French, *British Way of Warfare*, 58.

²³ *Ibid.*, 58.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 51.

²⁶ Daniel Baugh, *The Global Seven Years War, 1754-1763: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest* (London: Routledge Press, 2014), 249.

²⁷ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 215.

through British regulars. British strategy under William Pitt checked French gains in Europe, destroyed the French navy, and seized key colonies with the use of joint forces.

In late 1757, George II appointed William Pitt Southern Secretary. Pitt was determined to fight the war using the main British strength, the Royal Navy.²⁸ Pitt viewed the struggle with France as a war for colonial preeminence on a global scale.²⁹ Pitt's strategy attacked the French in their overseas colonies where they were weakest. The strategy to attack the French indirectly provided the British with many options. Firstly, it enabled Britain to leverage its naval superiority to not only project power at sea, but project power from the sea. The navy could be used as a strategic mobility platform and allow the army to conduct forcible entry near objectives. Secondly, the British avoided engaging the numerically superior French armies on the continent. At the beginning of 1759, the British only fielded 27 regiments of cavalry and 72 regiments of foot and did not exceed 85,000 soldiers.³⁰ Britain could not raise armies large enough to defeat the French in Europe. Thirdly, the British could combine their small army and large navy to attack at specific objectives. This allowed the British to use the Royal Navy in a fire support role and give its small army more combat power as they besieged fortresses in America, the West Indies, or made amphibious landings. Finally, it forced the British army and navy commanders to conduct actions in

²⁸ In July 1757 William Pitt had been asked to resume his role as the Southern Secretary. This ministry would be commonly known as the Pitt-Newcastle ministry. It would see the Duke of Newcastle focus his efforts on gaining royal concurrence with domestic and foreign policies, while Pitt focused on creating the strategy of those foreign policies. For more see Jeremy Black, *Pitt the Elder* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

²⁹ Martin Robson, *A History of the Royal Navy: The Seven Years War* (London: I.B. Taurus, 2016), 7.

³⁰ J.W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* (London: MacMillan, 1910), 364, 603. Brian Tunstall in *William Pitt: Earl of Chatham* also highlights Britain's problem of raising over 100,000 men for the army.

support of one another. This was the weakest part of the strategy, because the British had shown little ability in operating as a joint force.³¹

Failure of the Rochefort Raid: Lack of Unity of Effort

Addressing the challenges and threats . . . requires a comprehensive, whole of government approach that fully integrates our military and non-military efforts and those of our allies and partners. This approach puts a premium on unity of effort at all levels and with all participants.

—David Petraeus, Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony, 1 April 2009.

The first joint operation by the British in the Seven Years War was the raid on Rochefort in September 1757, which provided the British lessons on how to conduct joint operations. Joint operations were not new in British military thinking and had been conducted as early as 1693.³² However, the early amphibious operations lacked doctrinal agreement between the army and navy. The original concept of the Rochefort raid was to draw French troops away from the Duke of Cumberland's forces in Hannover. It was also part of a greater strategy to conduct subsequent raids along the coast of France. Pitt hoped he could force some French troops facing Cumberland to return to France to protect coastal cities and ports. However, the duke surrendered in July 1757 before the expedition was ready and its objectives changed to the destruction of shipyards and provisions.³³ William Pitt had underestimated how long it would take to put the expedition

³¹ Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 125. This definition defines joint force as two services assigned or attached to a single commander. As noted earlier this was not possible in the Eighteenth century British military. However, the British did operate as a joint force in operations throughout the Seven Years War.

³² Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine, eds., *The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1989), 36-37.

³³ Edward Hawke, *The Hawke Papers*, ed. Ruddock F. Mackay (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1990), 153.

together.³⁴ There was limited time in the year to get the expedition underway before weather in the channel became poor. Unity of effort were issues from the very beginning of the expedition. There were delays in receiving transports and unclear intelligence on French strength, which only made the operation more difficult. The main reason for failure at Rochefort was not the lack of intelligence but the inability of the army and navy commanders to achieve unity of effort to conduct tactical actions in support of operational objectives.

The raid on Rochefort suffered from limited unity of effort and poor intelligence. General John Mordaunt and Admiral Hawke took command of the land and naval components for the raid on Rochefort. Hawke and Mordaunt received their orders from George II and in it, the king ordered them to “act in conjunction and cooperate with” each other.³⁵ Hawke and Mordaunt failed to understand their role in joint operations and did neither. There were certainly great challenges for the Rochefort operation. The fleet arrived near Rochefort on 23 September 1757, but landings were delayed due to heavy surf and poor wind.³⁶ The navy that day reduced and seized the fortifications on the Isle of Aix without consulting or utilizing the army.³⁷ At this point the British operation stalled. There was limited operational intelligence on the fortifications, garrison, and troops around Rochefort. The intelligence on Rochefort was so poor that during a council of war an officer who had toured Rochefort in 1754 was called to testify from memory on whether the ditch surrounding Rochefort was dry.³⁸ Small boat patrols reported multiple formations along the shore of an

³⁴ Hawke, *Hawke Papers*, 150.

³⁵ Hawke, *Hawke Papers*, 152; *The Trial of General John Mordaunt*, Proceedings of General Court-Martial, 14-20 December 1757, 14.

³⁶ Richard Harding, *Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century: The British Expedition to the West Indies, 1740-1742* (Rochester: Boydell Press, 1991), 181.

³⁷ David Syrett, *Admiral Lord Howe* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 16.

³⁸ Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 266.

undetermined size which further confused the joint officer corps.³⁹ Some officers, like General James Wolfe, believed it was French militia and urged for the army to land. In the end, the British had no clear picture of what awaited them ashore. Nevertheless, General Mordaunt's and Admiral Hawke's inability to establish unity of effort was the real reason for failure.



Figure 1. Rochefort, 1757. “Chart of the Road of Basque,” *Wikipedia*, modified May 2009, accessed February 12, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raid_on_Rochefort.

³⁹ Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 266.

There was no unity of effort because Mordaunt and Hawke could not establish the responsibility for the landing. The main concern for Mordaunt was whether he would be able to communicate with and get back to the ships in an emergency. Richard Harding states, “the central problem facing Mordaunt—were the communications with the fleet secure enough to get adequate forces ashore, accomplish a task, and reembark?”⁴⁰ Mordaunt was there to raid, not occupy Rochefort. Therefore, Mordaunt needed more assurances from Hawke that he would be able to get the army back onto the ships. The admiral could not guarantee it. Hawke wrote, “As to the first precarious reason of winds and weather, I could not, as a seaman, when the question was urged, say I could bring them off in a storm and a great surf.”⁴¹ Mordaunt called councils of war on 25 September and 28 September. The first war council rejected landing because Rochefort could not be taken by escalade.⁴² During the council of war on 28 September, Hawke presented the army officers with an ultimatum. Hawke told them they must do something, must decide what to do, and the naval officers would await their decision; with that, he and his officers stormed out.⁴³ Unity of effort was failing. Later that day, the army presented the navy with a night landing plan, but the navy could not support it. Hawke said he had enough long boats to land half the army at night. The long boats would have to return to the ships to embark the rest of the army and by then the second wave would arrive during the day.⁴⁴ This was the final straw between the two services and the next day they agreed to abandon the operation and return home, having achieved nothing at all.

⁴⁰ Harding, *Amphibious Warfare*, 182.

⁴¹ Hawke, *Hawke Papers*, 185.

⁴² Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 266.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Trial, *Proceedings*, 58.

The British learned many lessons out of the failure at Rochefort. One was that joint service cooperation in the landing area was necessary to be successful.⁴⁵ Pitt knew his strategy to attack French colonies could not work without joint cooperation. Hawke and Mordaunt had failed to cooperate on the responsibility for the landing. Even as late as 28 September, when Hawke was imploring the army to do something, he and his commanders did not take part in planning the landings. Future operations needed officers who would communicate and operate together. Ligonier later selected officers for appointment based on this ability and willingness, rather than seniority.⁴⁶ Also, the landing boats for the Rochefort operation were unacceptable. The British needed specially designed landing craft to get troops ashore. The Navy Board quickly designed two craft which came in two different sizes equipped with rudders and small sails to increase control and speed.⁴⁷ They had either 16 or 20 oarsmen and could carry about a half a company of infantry or be fitted to carry artillery.⁴⁸ The need for these boats was taken directly from the difficulties at Rochefort.⁴⁹ Finally, doctrine needed clarification on how the operation would take place. According to David Syrett, “No established doctrine or standard operating procedure for the conduct of amphibious operations existed within the Royal Navy before May of 1758.”⁵⁰ After May 1758, the services developed clear instructions to include signals, loading instructions, and designation of who would

⁴⁵ Robson, *History of the Royal Navy*, 56.

⁴⁶ Field Marshall Ligonier pushed for the appointment of junior officers like Amherst, Wolfe, and others over more senior military commanders. He often clashed with George II over appointments. See Rex Whitworth, *Field Marshal Lord Ligonier: A Story of the British Army, 1702-1770* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958) and Anderson, *Crucible of War*.

⁴⁷ Syrett, *Howe*, 20.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, *Howe*, 19.

command the landing crafts.⁵¹ Additionally, naval forces provided an officer to oversee the landings and command a covering force during the operation.⁵² Martin Robson agrees, “The new *modus operandi* after Rochefort was for the navy to assume responsibility for the operation until the land forces had left the boats and made it to the shore, when the army commander would assume responsibility. In essence, Rochefort marked the birth of the British concept of ‘joint operations.’”⁵³ Rochefort gave the British important lessons on how to conduct future joint operations. British commanders would take advantage of these to achieve decisive successes from 1758 to 1762.

Louisbourg 1758: Massing Combat Power and Establishing Unity of Effort

When the army is landed, the business is half done.

—General James Wolfe

Louisbourg is an example of how the British successfully massed combat power and established unity of effort. William Pitt’s strategic objectives were to expel the French from North America.⁵⁴ The British had failed to take Louisbourg in 1757 and renewed their efforts in 1758. The operational planning for 1758 was more robust, collaborative, and complete than it had been in 1757. Pitt appointed General Jeffery Amherst to command the land component and Admiral Edward Boscawen to command the naval component for the operation against Louisbourg in

⁵¹ The Navy would command landing crafts and all personnel in it. Once the troops got out of the boat they reverted to Army command.

⁵² David Syrett, “The Methodology of British Amphibious Operations during the Seven Years and American Wars,” *Mariner’s Mirror* 58 (August 1972): 272.

⁵³ Robson, *History of the Royal Navy*, 56.

⁵⁴ John Campbell, Lord Loudon, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all British forces in North America in 1756 and attempted to meet this objective by seizing the operational objective of Louisbourg. However, the navy did not arrive in Halifax until 9 July which prevented collaborative planning or training between the services. Then poor weather until 4 August 1757 prevented the force from sailing. Loudon discovered a superior French fleet at Louisbourg and he abandoned the plans for landing on Cape Breton Island and for more see Anderson, 179, 208.

1758.⁵⁵ Even though these commanders had not conducted joint operations in the war, they were the beneficiaries of lessons learned from Rochefort. The British identified disunity of effort as cause of failure at Rochefort. The 1758 Louisbourg operation achieved decisive success because of the combination of massed combat power and unity of effort.




Figure 1. Siege of Louisbourg, 1758. William Wood, *The Great Fortress*, Chronicles of Canada (Toronto, Glasgow and Brook, 1920), xiii.

⁵⁵ Boscawen was a veteran of Cartagena in 1741 and carried out the execution of Admiral John Byng, see *The London Gazette*, 16-19 May 1741, No. 8015 (United Kingdom); *The Trial of the Honourable Admiral John Byng*, Proceedings of a Court-Martial, 29 December 1756- 27 January 1757, 137. Boscawen clearly knew the dangers of a lack of unity of effort and ill-coordinated assaults on fortified places. Amherst had spent the first years of the war with Prince Ferdinand as the quartermaster for the Hessian forces of Army of Observation. He had proved himself a capable logistician and was respected as for his ability to work with the Hessians. However, Amherst's main benefit was his association with Ligonier. Field Marshal Ligonier helped secure his appointment into the army in 1740 and Amherst served as his aide during the War of Austrian Succession, see Rex Whitworth, *Field Marshal Lord Ligonier*, 46, 236-237.

The British successfully massed their forces to seize Louisbourg in 1758. They successfully assembled logistical, naval and army forces at a precise time to produce decisive results. In preparation for the 1758 operation, Pitt sent instructions to Admiral Francis Holburne to winter part of the British fleet in Halifax, construct wharfs for logistical support to ships-of-the-line, and create a base for the 1758 operation.⁵⁶ At Halifax, the navy repaired damaged ships and stockpiled stores coming from England and America until transporting them to the army.⁵⁷ Local supply was important; Brigadier General Charles Lawrence, Governor of Nova Scotia, ordered his agents to supply 25,000 pounds of fresh beef a week for the joint force.⁵⁸ To ensure adequate supply for the Louisbourg operation the navy board constantly requisitioned shipping in England and America. In 1758 forty-three transports (10,964 tons) sailed from England to America carrying troops and provisions and further shipping was contracted in Southampton and New York for the coming operation.⁵⁹ David Syrett states to attract more shipping, “In 1757 the Commissioners of the Navy increased the rate for ships chartered for service in the Atlantic to 13s per ton, whereas vessels sailing to Germany received 9s 8d and 10s per ton.”⁶⁰ These rates to America continued to rise throughout the war showing the importance of the American theater of war in British strategy, as

⁵⁶ William Pitt, *Correspondence of William Pitt When Secretary of State with Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commissioners in America*, ed. Gertrude S. Kimball (London: Macmillan, 1906), 1:125.

⁵⁷ In a testament to their success, the Royal Navy Dockyards were commissioned in 1759 and the Royal Navy’s North American Station Headquartered here until 1819. The dockyards continued as the summer home of the Royal Navy North American Station until 1905. In 1905, it was transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy. The port is still occupied today as Canadian Forces Base Halifax and has more personnel stationed there than any Canadian military base.

⁵⁸ Hugh Boscawen, *The Capture of Louisbourg, 1758* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 145. William Pitt’s promise of British reimbursement for colonial expenditures enabled the leveraging of local sources of supply.

⁵⁹ Boscawen, *Capture of Louisbourg*, 65.

⁶⁰ David Syrett, *Shipping and Military Power in the Seven Years War: The Sails of Victory* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2008), 15.

well as the sheer number of ships involved in the logistical effort. The total number of British transports is unknown. What is clear is there was enough shipping available to support multiple amphibious operations in multiple theaters without seriously hampering British merchant trade.⁶¹ The importance of logistical support cannot be overstated. The British employed a complex system of resupply from England and America to ensure the fleet and the army could continue to besiege Louisbourg. Britain's ability to mass logistical support allowed them to maintain a large land and naval component during the Louisbourg operation.

The British operationally massed their forces by allocating more regular forces in 1758. General Amherst had 11,401 regulars and approximately 3,500 provincials for his operations on Cape Breton, almost seventeen percent of the entire British Army.⁶² In 1758, General Amherst had more regulars than anyone in North America. Admiral Edward Boscawen supported him with over forty warships, at least 23 ships-of-the-line, amounting to seventeen percent of the Royal Navy.⁶³ Unlike in 1757, fifteen of these ships were third rates or better; carrying sixty-four guns or more. The British success in massing their logistical, naval and army combat power at a time advantageous to them allowed them to seize Louisbourg. However, the Rochefort raid had also massed combat power and therefore the British also needed unity of effort to succeed at Louisbourg.

The British created an effective unity of effort for the Louisbourg operation which was decisive to their success. Admiral Boscawen took part in the initial planning with Pitt, Anson, and Ligonier in late 1757.⁶⁴ Admiral Boscawen arrived in Halifax a few weeks earlier than General

⁶¹ Syrett, *Shipping*, 125.

⁶² Boscawen, *Capture of Louisbourg*, 49, 316; Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 24.

⁶³ Boscawen, *Capture of Louisbourg*, 316.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 48-50.

Amherst and proceeded to prepare the expedition. Boscawen, in Amherst's absence, took charge of expedition and focused on the responsibility to transport the troops to the shore by conducting joint planning and rehearsals with the army.⁶⁵ Boscawen continually trained the forces by establishing joint signals, conducting small boat training, and amphibious rehearsals.⁶⁶ General Amherst arrived aboard the HMS *Namur* on 28 May 1758 and conferred with Admiral Boscawen.⁶⁷ The commanders agreed to landing at one beach and slightly shifting the landing force composition but both commanders were satisfied in the planning and preparation.⁶⁸ This can be seen by the fact that the landings took place only eleven days after Amherst's arrival. During the landings on June 8, the Royal Navy took charge of its responsibility of transporting troops to the shore and organized the landings to ensure regimental integrity as much as possible.⁶⁹ Naval signals facilitated communication across the fleet and landing force which further ensured unity of effort between the army and navy. The army understood it assumed command once troops were ashore and positioned key leaders with the lead landing craft.⁷⁰ The training undertaken earlier was important when the landings ran into problems. The unity of effort between the navy and army ensured success. Admiral Boscawen and General Amherst's emphasis on unity of effort is seen in the actions of junior officers. Several Royal Navy officers in charge of the landing craft took great risk to get the

⁶⁵ Boscawen, *Capture of Louisbourg*, 124-125.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 129-133.

⁶⁷ The expedition departed Halifax on 27 May 1757. General Amherst linked up with them a day later.

⁶⁸ Jeffery Amherst, *The Journals of Jeffery Amherst, 1757-1763, Volume 1: The Daily and Personal Journals*, ed. Richard Andrews (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2015), 22, 25. The landing beach was the same beach landed at in the 1745 expedition to capture Louisbourg.

⁶⁹ Syrett, *Shipping*, 88-89.

⁷⁰ Boscawen, *Capture of Louisbourg*, xxxviii.

assigned infantry to the shore.⁷¹ These navy officers clearly understood they needed to get the army to the shore so it could begin siege operations. Amherst and Boscawen conferred over the progress of the landings at 8:00 a.m. on the beach, as the joint team continued unloading troops and supplies.⁷² The navy continued to land stores, artillery, and other equipment for the Army over the course of the siege. There was clearly unity of effort at the landings, but unity of effort needed to continue after the army was ashore.

British unity of effort continued until the end of the siege. Boscawen and Amherst had open discussions about the progress of the siege and how the navy could support it.⁷³ Amherst requested the transfer of naval artillery and ammunition to his forces ashore. Naval cannons onboard ship provided the army with immediate replacements for lost pieces.⁷⁴ Over the next several weeks the navy provided six 32-pound cannon, 400 rounds of 32-pound ammunition, and 600 sailors to support land operations.⁷⁵ Boscawen's orders required him to force the harbor and provide direct fire support to the army, but up to this point in the siege he could not do it. While the army conducted siege operations, five French ships-of-the-line in the harbor blocked Admiral Boscawen from attacking the exposed waterside of the fortress. Army cannons heavily damaged three of the French ships and put them out of action.⁷⁶ On 25 July Admiral Boscawen conducted a raid to capture the two remaining French ships-of-the-line and allow the navy to enter the harbor to attack the fortress's weaker seaward side. The army assisted the navy by conducting a continuous

⁷¹ Ibid., 165.

⁷² Boscawen, *Capture of Louisbourg*, 168.

⁷³ Amherst, *Journals of Jeffrey Amherst*, 43.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 41-42. In this citation, Amherst refers to cannons that exploded in normal use not from attacks by French cannons. The French and British exchanged artillery fire throughout the siege and several British guns were damaged or destroyed.

⁷⁵ Amherst, *Journals of Jeffrey Amherst*, 40, 45.

⁷⁶ Baugh, 347.

bombardment of the fortress to allow the British sailors to slip into the harbor undetected. General Amherst noted in his journal the importance of the diversionary bombardment and placed himself in the trenches to oversee its conduct.⁷⁷ The raid was successful in capturing one ship and destroying another. The French, seeing the seaward side now exposed and further resistance hopeless, capitulated Louisbourg the following day. Clearly, the British unity of effort was decisive to their success.

The 1758 operation for Louisbourg was successful because the British massed combat power and established unity of effort. The British clearly massed their logistical, naval and army combat power at Louisbourg. The British amplified their naval and land combat power through logistics by moving ammunition, food, and equipment from various points around the globe. The British successfully massed their operational forces to successfully besiege Louisbourg. However, as seen at Rochefort, mass does not guarantee success. It must be combined with unity of effort. Amherst and Boscawen's unity of effort was decisive. They understood their roles, the roles of their counterpart, and the overall objective they needed to achieve together. Louisbourg was the first British major victory in the Seven Years War and bolstered public morale.⁷⁸ The victory gave British leaders confidence in their strategic plan and the ability of their commanders to conduct joint operations. The British conducted several joint operations over the next four years. The British attack on Guadeloupe in 1759 also displayed aspects of mass and unity of effort, but more importantly, it displayed the British understanding of objective.

⁷⁷ Amherst, *Journals of Jeffrey Amherst*, 45.

⁷⁸ Boscawen, *Capture of Louisbourg*, 303. The victory was so important that when William Pitt heard the news of Louisbourg's capture he called it the greatest news for the kingdom in years and had coins struck to commemorate Boscawen and Amherst.

Guadeloupe: Shifting Military Objectives to Meet Political Objectives

To ensure attaining an objective, one should have alternate objectives. An attack that converges on one point should threaten, and be able to diverge against another. Only by this flexibility of aim can strategy be attuned to the uncertainty of war.

—Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart

The Guadeloupe operation displays the importance of military commanders understanding political shifts and how their military objectives support new political objectives. In October 1758, following success at Louisbourg, William Pitt sent out orders for an expedition to take Martinique. The British were expanding their political objectives to gain valuable West Indian islands from France for bartering during negotiations.⁷⁹ Pitt believed the French would want to trade Martinique for Minorca.⁸⁰ Strategically, the French West Indies were an important link to the French triangular trade and provided cash for the French economy.⁸¹ The islands also cut into British economic productivity through smuggling with the American colonies.⁸² In seizing Martinique, the most prosperous French island, the British were attempting to place greater strain on the French economy. The political objective for the 1759 Guadeloupe operation was to gain a key bartering piece for peace negotiations. The strategic objective was to damage the economic links between France and the West Indies. The operational objective was to seize Martinique. However, Guadeloupe, not Martinique, was seized.

The British commanders shifted the operational objective from Martinique to Guadeloupe because they did not have enough mass to seize Martinique and seizing Guadeloupe still met

⁷⁹ Frank McLynn, *1759: The Year Britain Became Master of the World* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004), 103.

⁸⁰ Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 385.

⁸¹ McLynn, *1759*, 100.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 100-101.

political and strategic objectives. General Peregrine Hopson and Admiral Sir John Moore commanded the Martinique expedition.⁸³ After departing England the fleet resupplied at Barbados, rested for ten days and practiced landing operations.⁸⁴ British commanders fully understood the difficulty of their operations. The Guadeloupe commanders saw the benefits of Amherst's and Boscawen's preparations before Louisbourg emulated them. The expedition arrived off Martinique with approximately 6,000 regulars and marines.⁸⁵ However, the commanders could not reduce Martinique's fortress because they lacked the ability to build roads, and move artillery and supplies for a siege. The fortress was on high ground and therefore could not be bombarded by the navy. The commanders left Martinique and agreed to attempt to seize the island of Guadeloupe to meet political and strategic objectives.⁸⁶ The political objectives were still met by gaining a bargaining chip during peace negotiations. Guadeloupe was an acceptable alternative strategic objective as it produced more sugar than Martinique and its loss would be disastrous to France economically.⁸⁷ The island of Guadeloupe clearly satisfied British political and strategic objectives. British actions show that military commanders must also be ready to shift operational objectives to achieve political and strategic objectives. British commanders evaluated new tactical objectives for Guadeloupe but would be forced to shift their objectives throughout the operation.

The British initially had difficulty shifting their tactical objectives to meet political, strategic, and operational objectives. Guadeloupe is two islands consisting of Basse-Terre and

⁸³ Pitt, *Correspondence of William Pitt*, 1:367.

⁸⁴ William Pitt, *Correspondence of William Pitt When Secretary of State with Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commissioners in America*. Ed. Gertrude S. Kimball (London: Macmillan, 1906), 2:20.

⁸⁵ Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War*, 1:377.

⁸⁶ Julian Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Combined Strategy* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907), 2:379.

⁸⁷ Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 385.

Grand Terre separated by the Salee River. The British forces arrived off the coast of Basse-Terre on 22 January 1759, and proceeded to conduct a naval bombardment of Fort Charles, allowing the army to seize the fort on the twenty-fourth.⁸⁸ At this point, British unity of effort began to breakdown. Small French militia forces launched raids from the mountains. The army conducted no operations outside of Fort Charles and tropical diseases reduced the strength of both the army and naval force.⁸⁹ Moore, exacerbad at General Hopson's inaction, conducted operations against Grand Terre on his own.⁹⁰ The British needed to shift their tactical objectives to the meet their operational objective. While they had landed on Basse-Terre they had not landed on Grand Terre which was supplying French forces with food and ammunition. The British needed to seize Fort Louis on Grand Terre to cut these supplies. On 13 February 1759 the navy with a small army force, seized Fort Louis. While this was a naval operation, General John Barrington, second in command of the army, had endorsed this operation since 28 January 1759.⁹¹ It can be inferred General Barrington encouraged the Navy to take the action on their own. General Barrington's own actions after the death of General Hopson also support this conclusion. Hopson died on 27 February 1759, and command passed to General Barrington helping to restore unity of effort and allowing the British to shift their tactical objectives.⁹²

⁸⁸ Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 380.

⁸⁹ Pitt, *Correspondence of William Pitt*, 2:49.

⁹⁰ McLynn, *1759*, 111.

⁹¹ Pitt, *Correspondence of William Pitt*, 2:45-46.

⁹² McLynn, *1759*, 112.



Figure 3. Guadeloupe Operation, 1759. Author created.

Barrington shifted British tactical objectives to meet the operational objective. Barrington had 2,796 men fit for service on 2 March 1759.⁹³ He left one regiment at Fort Charles and embarked the rest to the island of Grand Terre.⁹⁴ Barrington recognized his soldiers could not pursue the French militia into the difficult terrain of Guadeloupe but he needed to use naval support

⁹³ Pitt, *Correspondence of William Pitt*, 2:46.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2:46, 52.

to isolate the defenders from external support.⁹⁵ Barrington's tactical plan was three-phased and leveraged his naval support. The first phase was to secure Fort Louis by clearing the French from Grand Terre. Barrington made a landing and attacked two towns on the eastern side of Grand Terre. The French moved a sizeable force to protect the towns allowing Barrington to land 300 Soldiers behind the French forces and defeat them. After this, the British garrison at Fort Louis cleared the remaining French from the area. Barrington, with a secure base on Grand Terre, could now work on forcing Basse-Terre to capitulate. The second phase was to land on the north side of Basse-Terre to cut the smuggling of supplies to French militia. Barrington accomplished this by the beginning of April.⁹⁶ The final phase cleared the eastern side of Basse-Terre of French forces. Barrington did this by conducting landings on Guadeloupe's eastern shore and then, with naval support, clearing the coast.⁹⁷ Daniel Baugh argues, "Although the defending militia had better knowledge of the terrain, they were poorly trained and their commanders made many mistakes...[Barrington] though feeling his way, profited from the use of ships and boats and almost never put a foot wrong."⁹⁸ Guadeloupe capitulated on 2 May 1759. Barrington created a tactical plan designed to achieve an operational objective. He clearly shifted the tactical objectives to meet operational, strategic, and political objectives.

The British captured Guadeloupe because they recognized that objectives can shift throughout an operation. The operation achieved political, strategic, and operational objectives. British political objectives were satisfied because Guadeloupe served as an important bargaining

⁹⁵ Pitt, *Correspondence of William Pitt*, 2:48.

⁹⁶ Ibid., *Correspondence of William Pitt*, 2:99.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 381; Pitt, *Correspondence of William Pitt*, 2:99.

chip during negotiations.⁹⁹ The island would also have secondary benefits for Britain. First, the island would ship 10,000 tons of sugar as well as coffee, cotton, and cocoa in return for British manufactured goods between 1759 and mid-1760.¹⁰⁰ Guadeloupe would amount to almost three-quarters of the exports of Jamaica, Britain's most profitable West Indian possession.¹⁰¹ Secondly, the trade money helped stabilize government credit and helped finance British operations in 1760.¹⁰² The British exceeded their strategic objective of damaging economic links between France and the West Indies. French trade to the West Indies all but collapsed in 1759. Baugh argues, "Taken as a whole, French commerce with the West Indies fell by the end of 1758 to a value less than a quarter of the prewar figure, and in 1759-1760 it was almost non-existent."¹⁰³ France's economy began serious contractions throughout 1758 and 1759 because the defeats of 1759 had shaken public faith in the war. By March 1759 the French government had spent all its revenue for 1759 and 1760 and there was no trade or future cash coming in.¹⁰⁴ The British achieved their strategic objective of damaging links between the West Indies and France and put the French economy into serious strain. Britain successfully displayed the powerful nature of joint operations when political objectives are understood. From the beginning of the operation, British commanders displayed their understanding of political and strategic objectives. They appropriated new operational and tactical objectives during operations to meet political and strategic objectives. Britain's Guadeloupe operation clearly displayed the principle of objective. The final joint

⁹⁹ Richard Middleton, *The Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and Conduct of the Seven Years' War 1757-1762* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 120.

¹⁰⁰ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 315; McLynn, *1759*, 117.

¹⁰¹ Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 385.

¹⁰² McLynn, *1759*, 117.

¹⁰³ Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 231.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 448.

operation in Havana displays the British ability to use unity of effort, mass, and objective for decisive success in joint operations.

Strategic Context of the Seven Years War in 1762

The war had undergone significant changes by the beginning of 1762.¹⁰⁵ The British completed their conquest of Canada in 1760 and seized Martinique in February 1762. The Spanish became greatly alarmed at British control of the sea lanes into the Caribbean and Mexico.¹⁰⁶ Spain wanted to ensure the British did not destroy the balance of power in colonies and conquer Spanish possessions as they had done to the French. France encouraged these fears and Spain entered the war as a French ally in 1761. The Havana operation displays William Pitt's strategy was still being pursued. Fred Anderson claims, "Pitt's war went on without him: partially because Bute and the other ministers feared the consequences of an abrupt change in policy, and partially because no one dared propose an alternative to the military strategies perfected in his ministry."¹⁰⁷ While Pitt had been the architect of the strategy, the true executors of the strategy were Ligonier and Anson. The operation for Havana would demonstrate the ability of the British to quickly employ objective, mass, and unity of effort to achieve decisive results.

¹⁰⁵ George II died on 25 October 1760 and was succeeded by his grandson George III. John Stuart, Lord Bute, replaced the Duke of Newcastle as First Lord. Charles Wyndham, Earl of Egremont, replaced William Pitt as Southern Secretary.

¹⁰⁶ The French were encouraging their Spanish allies to enter the war after 1759. The alarming British victories in 1759 and 1760 encouraged Charles III of Spain to reverse their neutrality and enter the war on the side of the French. France and Spain concluded the Family Compact on 15 August 1761 bringing Spain into the war.

¹⁰⁷ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 490.




Figure 4. Siege of Havana, 1762. Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America 1754-1766* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 500.

Havana: Using Joint Operations to Meet Political Intent

The higher level of grand strategy [is] that of conducting war with a far-sighted regard to the state of the peace that will follow.

—Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart

As with Guadeloupe, the British successfully understood shifting political and strategic objectives as war began with Spain. On 6 January 1762, select members of the cabinet including Lord Bute, Anson, and Ligonier met to discuss the political and strategic objectives against

Spain.¹⁰⁸ But clearly defined the political objective: end British involvement in the Seven Years War.¹⁰⁹ Ligonier and Anson understood this and determined the new strategic objective was to get Spain to a negotiated peace. After weighing alternatives, Anson and Ligonier recommended seizing Havana.¹¹⁰ Havana's capture would achieve British political and strategic objectives because it was the most important economic and military center of the Spanish colonial empire. Ligonier and Anson agreed Havana could be taken if an expedition could be put together before the Spanish had time to reinforce their defenses. Ligonier and Anson dispatched orders and instructions for operations against Havana before the declaration of war, thus displaying their anticipation and understanding of the shift in political and strategic objectives.¹¹¹ Ligonier and Anson, understanding the change in objectives, achieved mass at Havana by maneuvering forces from England, the West Indies, and America to achieve decisive results.

The British massed forces quickly from England, North America, and the West Indies to achieve decisive results at Havana. In terms of eighteenth-century warfare, the British moved very rapidly. On 7 January 1762, the Admiralty requested the Commissioners of the Navy to have 8,000 to 10,000 tons of shipping available immediately as well as constructing twenty-five flat-bottomed boats.¹¹² The navy was not the only one rapidly assembling forces. The journal of Ensign Archibald Robertson shows how quickly the Army pulled its forces together. Robertson was notified in Edinburgh on 15 January 1762, to return to London and less than two months later was sailing for

¹⁰⁸ Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 508.

¹⁰⁹ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 495.

¹¹⁰ Some in the ministry suggested sending a British expedition to support their ally Portugal.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 490.

¹¹² Syrett, *Shipping*, 104-105

Havana.¹¹³ General George Keppel, the army commander, and Admiral George Pocock, the naval commander, departed Britain with just over 4,000 men and seven ships-of-the-line because there were not enough troops or warships at home to support the expedition.¹¹⁴ Field Marshal Ligonier determined there were approximately 19,440 men in the West Indies and America available for the expedition.¹¹⁵ Keppel and Pocock arrived at Cape Hispanola and received forces from General Monckton, who had just seized Martinique, expanding force totals to about 12,000 soldiers and fifteen ships-of-the-line.¹¹⁶ This force was experienced in battles in North America and the West Indies. They were trained in landings and were professional soldiers and sailors buoyed with confidence from victories. Keppel was confident the troops he had could take Havana and Pocock believed he had enough ships to blockade the harbor. Forces from America took longer to reach Havana but they played a vital role. The declaration of war did not reach General Amherst until 1 April 1762.¹¹⁷ He was ordered to have transports and forces ready depart by 1 May, which now was impossible. However, Amherst immediately began assembling what forces he had for the expedition. Amherst received and dispatched from 4 May 1762 to 11 June 1762, over 2,400 men of the 4,000 sent to Havana with supplies.¹¹⁸ Amherst sent by the beginning of July another 1,454 men and supplies to Havana.¹¹⁹ These 4,000 reinforcements, which began arriving on 28 July 1762,

¹¹³ Archibald Robertson, *His Diaries and Sketches in America, 1762-1780* (New York: New York Public Library, 1971), 49.

¹¹⁴ David Syrett, ed., *The Siege and Capture of Havana, 1762* (London: Navy Records Society, 1970), xiv.

¹¹⁵ Whitworth, *Field Marshal Lord Ligonier*, 364.

¹¹⁶ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 409; Syrett, *Siege*, xiv.

¹¹⁷ Amherst, *Journals of Jeffrey Amherst*, 291; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 490. General Amherst was appointed Commander in Chief of all British forces in America after his victory at Louisbourg. The reason for the delay was the original orders were sent out on one ship and lost.

¹¹⁸ Amherst, *Journals of Jeffrey Amherst*, 293.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 453.

proved critical for the British success at Havana. If the reinforcements had not been sent as quickly as they were Keppel would not have taken Havana.¹²⁰ Yellow fever ravaged Keppel's forces and he needed these forces to storm Fort Morro on 31 July 1762. While the British massed their forces at Havana, as at Louisbourg, without unity of effort they would likely have failed.

British unity of effort was again decisive to success at Havana. General Keppel and Admiral Pocock's force was experienced in joint operations. The army and navy leaders had conducted multiple joint operations and four out of the five brigadiers involved had participated in the Martinique operation.¹²¹ Many of the regiments, such as the 35th Regiment of Foot, had extensive battle experience in America and the West Indies and had participated in landings with the navy at Louisbourg, Quebec, Martinique, and elsewhere.¹²² Following joint doctrine, Admiral Pocock appointed a naval officer to oversee the landings, and he chose Admiral Augustus Keppel, General George Keppel's brother to ensure close coordination between the two services.¹²³ As at Louisbourg, close coordination between the army and navy was required during the landings and in their subsequent movement toward Havana's main fort, Fort Morro. For example, as the army advanced the navy spotted a small fort blocking their way. HMS *Dragon* sailed close to the shore, engaged the fort, silenced the enemy guns and allowed the army to continue unimpeded to Fort Morro.¹²⁴ At Havana, like Louisbourg, British unity of effort did not end with the landings.

¹²⁰ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 500-501.

¹²¹ Syrett, *Shipping*, 121.

¹²² The 35th Regiment of Foot was one such regiment. The battle history begins at Fort William Henry in 1756, Louisbourg 1758, Fort Frederic 1758, Quebec 1759, Martinique 1762 and Cuba 1762, see 35th Regiment of Foot, "Seven Years' War Journal of the Proceedings of the 35th Regiment of Foot" [ca. 1765], Manuscript collection, John Carter Brown Library, Providence, 10 April 2012, accessed 15 September 2016, <https://archive.org/details/sevenyearswarjou00flet>.

¹²³ Syrett, *Shipping*, 113.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 117.

The British exhibited unity of effort until the end of the siege. As the siege continued the Navy played an important role in the land operations. The western side of Havana had the vital fresh water Chorrera River. The British needed the fresh water of the Chorrera River to sustain their forces sieging Fort Morro on the east side of Havana. On 15 June 1762, 1200 men moved via transport and flat bottom boat to the area of the Chorrera River and made landing there.¹²⁵ Sailors spent the rest of the siege filling buckets from the Chorrera and transporting them to the forces around Fort Morro.¹²⁶ The water provided by the sailors was critical and without it, the siege would have failed. The unity of effort went beyond just transporting supplies but to providing sailors for performing critical missions on land. The diseases in Cuba had killed or disabled many of Keppel's men. Through the siege, 1,800 men would die, mostly of disease, and another 4,000 would fall ill.¹²⁷ In particular there was a shortage of artillerymen and Keppel needed ships gunners to replace his artillerymen. Baugh claims, "A battery of 32 pounders was entirely manned by seamen, who achieved a rapid rate of fire that the artillerymen had not hitherto witnessed."¹²⁸ This was not the only manpower provided by the navy ashore. In June, Keppel had begun sapping the walls of Fort Morro. As his soldiers worked, they continuously succumbed to heat exhaustion, fever, and other diseases. He needed more manpower to dig sapping trenches and he turned to Admiral Pocock to provide 40 sailors to support his operations ashore.¹²⁹ In the fleet was Admiral Boscawen's former flagship, HMS *Namur*, with many Cornish sailors aboard. Cornishmen were traditionally miners in England and they would be very valuable to Keppel ashore. Keppel wrote to Pocock, "Your own

¹²⁵ Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 603.

¹²⁶ David Syrett, *Siege*, 200, 223, 228.

¹²⁷ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 500-501.

¹²⁸ Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 604.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 605.

ship is the most likely to be able to furnish as she did belong to a Cornish chief, Admiral Boscawen.”¹³⁰ The sappers from the navy were important as they enabled the British to sap the fort’s walls and storm it on 31 July 1762. Fort Morro’s capture allowed the British to move cannon onto the heights above Havana and bombard it which lead to Havana’s capitulation on 13 August 1762. The unity of effort between the army and navy again proved decisive for the British. The navy played an active role in sustaining and conducting combat operations ashore and at sea. Most importantly, Havana highlights the importance of all three joint principles.

The British successfully integrated the principles of objective, mass, and unity of effort at Havana. In the new war with Spain Lord Anson and Field Marshal Ligonier identified the shifting political and strategic objectives. The capture of Havana caused the Spanish significant loss in finances, prestige, and military forces. The British prize money valued at over £737,000.¹³¹ Also, the British captured nine Spanish ships-of-the-line amounting to almost one-fifth of the Spanish Navy.¹³² Furthermore, the British shattered the belief of Havana’s invincibility. In terms of mass, in a little over five months the British had assembled one of the most powerful joint forces employed during the Seven Years War. David Syrett argues, “Almost without incident, an army of sixteenth thousand men had been assembled from both sides of the Atlantic, conveyed to Cuba, and landed at Havana. This army was then supported and reinforced by the navy while it carried out the most difficult siege undertaken by the British army.”¹³³ The forces came from almost all the theaters of war: America, the West Indies and England. This is important because all the forces

¹³⁰ Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 605. Admiral Boscawen was Cornish, born in Tregothnan, Cornwall, and recruited from the Cornwall area. Which was a large mining area in England.

¹³¹ Robson, *History of the Royal Navy*, 182.

¹³² Baugh, *Global Seven Years War*, 608.

¹³³ Syrett, *Siege*, xxxiv.

played key roles in the siege. The West Indies and English forces provided the nucleus of the army, while the American contingent gave Keppel enough reinforcements to storm Fort Morro. Unity of effort underpinned all the British efforts for Havana. The operation laid out by Ligonier and Anson required, speed, planning and coordination as it was extremely complex. Quite simply it was the most remarkable and successful joint operation undertaken by the British Army and Royal Navy in the Seven Years War.

Conclusion

If the leader is filled with high ambition and if he pursues his aims with audacity and strength of will, he will reach them in spite of all obstacles

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

The British problem in the Seven Years War was to seize key political and economic French colonies. The British solution to this problem was to conduct joint operations. However, the army and navy needed to learn how to operate jointly. Prior to the Seven Years War, the last British joint operation at Cartagena had ended disastrously with the army and navy blaming each other for the operation's failure.¹³⁴ The British had conducted some successful joint operations during the War of Austrian Succession, but those lessons were forgotten by the start of the Seven Years War. Rochefort exemplifies the British lack of understanding in joint operations. Rochefort was the first British joint operation and it, like Cartagena, resulted in the army and navy blaming each other for the operation's failure. The army and navy needed to establish roles and responsibilities between one another to conduct joint operations. These procedures were established after Rochefort and enabled British joint operations. The British knew what they wanted to do; wage war in the colonies

¹³⁴ For more on the Cartagena expedition see, Harding, *Amphibious Warfare*.

against the French. However, they had not shown until after Louisbourg they could conduct such joint operations.

The British improved their joint operations by utilizing mass, objective, and unity of effort. William Pitt's political objectives were: conquering French Canada and other French colonies, destroying the French navy to secure Britain, and blocking French armies in Europe. Pitt made clear to Lord Anson and Field Marshal Ligonier his prioritization of the colonial war over the war in Europe. Pitt's prioritization allowed Anson and Ligonier to mass army and navy forces for both short and long operations. This ordering also allowed military leaders to focus their operational objectives during operations. Anson and Ligonier further highlight the importance of prioritization in their selection of Havana over other possible objectives in the war. British clarification of joint doctrine led to improved joint operations. The British established doctrine on landing teams, naval control over the transit area to the shore, and joint signaling to control amphibious operations. These doctrinal changes improved the unity of effort between joint commanders. The British ability to conduct joint operations was unparalleled at the end of the Seven Years War. US military planners can clearly learn from the British experiences during the Seven Years War.

Military planners can further their comprehension of the principle of unity of command by understanding why unity of effort is important. Unity of effort was imperative if the British were going to be able to seize key French political and economic colonies. Unity of effort is key to successful unified action. According to JP 1, "Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome discord, inadequate structure and procedures, incompatible communications, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations."¹³⁵ As US forces operate around the world

¹³⁵ JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, xv.

with a variety of multinational, interagency, and interdepartmental partners it is imperative the US military achieves unity of effort. Like the United States, the British needed unity of effort across its military, interagency, and interdepartmental partners. The British engaged economic, military, and political forces to support the war effort. For the United States today, there are very few conflicts which can be solved purely by the military. Small conflicts require a whole of government approach, which requires US military planners to operate in unity of effort with its partners. Furthermore, the US military has more obligations around the world than it has available forces. The shortfall of forces drives US military services to work together with limited forces to create greater mass.

US military planners can study British joint operations to see the effectiveness of applying mass at key locations. The British had limited forces to attack Canada, Guadeloupe, and Havana. However, the British used the Royal Navy as a strategic mobility platform to move army forces to mass objectives. US forces, as previously stated, have limited resources to address a variety of problems around the world. Therefore, it is important for the US military to properly apply mass. In massing combat power, joint forces can enable even numerically inferior forces to produce decisive results achieve greater effects than they could alone, and allow the US military to maximize resources.¹³⁶ This directly supports the US Army's understanding of its operating concept of "Winning in a Complex World". According to former Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno, "One of the things that's changed in the world is the velocity of instability and the necessity to deploy our capabilities simultaneously to several different continents at the same time."¹³⁷ General

¹³⁶ JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, A-2.

¹³⁷ Michelle Tan, "Army unveils new plan to 'win in a complex world,'" *The Army Times*, 13 October 2014, accessed 15 January 2017, <https://www.armytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2014/10/13/army-unveils-new-plan-to-win-in-a-complex-world/17180141/>

Odierno acknowledges the US Army will be engaged around the world in a multitude of operations. Military planners must properly mass joint forces to ensure there is limited waste of resources and allow a small force to have an impact greater than their size. The ability of the United States to use air and naval forces as strategic mobility and fire support platforms gives the army and marines greater flexibility and combat power. The ability to properly mass forces will give the US military greater flexibility in shifting to new political and strategic objectives.

Political objectives define the military objectives in war. JP 1 states, “While the various forms and methods of warfare are ultimately expressed in concrete military action, the three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—link tactical actions to achievement of national objectives.”¹³⁸ Military planners must continually reframe whether their actions are driving toward political objectives. As stated earlier, shifting political objectives will require shifting military objectives. The British in Guadeloupe were successful in shifting tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Leaders at each level of war understood the larger political objective, which enabled them to properly shift objectives at their level. US military planners need to understand shifting political objectives. Planners who understand these shifts can ensure military objectives remain in line with political objectives, properly allocate mass to those objectives, and ensures unity of effort across the entire US effort.

British joint operations during the Seven Years War are examples of mass, objective, and unity of effort for US military planners to study. The US military will continue to conduct joint operations into the future. Mass will continue to be important as the United States faces threats in the future. Military planners’ ability to understand political objectives will allow all objectives to be linked to tactical action. If planners cannot they will waste precious resources and potentially

¹³⁸ JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, x.

lives on needless operations. Unity of effort provides the foundation for unified action. It is imperative that military planners understand the capabilities, roles and responsibilities, and doctrine of the joint forces. Understanding these builds trust, confidence and competence and in turn enables unity of effort across our joint forces. The British learned this over time and were successful in their joint operations against the French. US military planners must properly apply themselves to studying, executing, and improving joint doctrine to ensure the continuation of the US military's unassailable strategic advantage in joint operations.

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